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Wealth Concentration in a Developing Economy:  





Abstract : We use large samples of estate tax returns to construct new series on 
wealth concentration in Paris and France from 1807 to 1994. Wealth concentration in 
Paris and in France increased until World War I and then fell abruptly.  The rise in 
inequality prior to WWI accelerated (rather than stabilized) during the 1860-1913 
period. This was largely driven by the growth of large industrial and financial estates 
and coincided with the decline of aristocratic fortunes (until 1857, the share of 
aristocrats and real estate in top estates was actually rising). The decline in wealth 
concentration that followed World War I appears to have been prompted by the 1914-
1945 shocks rather than by a two-sector, Kuznets-type process. Inequality fell both in 
Paris and in the rest of France. Finally, the very high levels of wealth concentration 
observed on the eve of World War I were associated with individuals who lived of 
capital income rather than active entrepreneurs. In particular, the age profile of 
wealth looks markedly different around 1900-1913 than in other periods. At that time 
top wealth holders were in their 70s and 80s, whereas they had been in their 50s at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century and would be so again at the end of the 
twentieth century. These results shed new light on the ongoing debate about wealth 





This paper presents new series on wealth concentration in Paris and France 
from 1807 to 1994. These series were constructed using large samples of individual 
estate tax returns that we collected in the Paris archives for various years between 
1807 and 1902, as well as tabulations by size of estate compiled by the French tax 
administration regularly since 1902. 
Our general motivation for constructing such series is the study of the two-way 
interaction between development and distribution. More specifically, one of our 
primary goals is to better understand the decline in income and wealth inequality that 
occurred during the first half of the twentieth century in today’s developed countries. 
Recent research on France suggests that this decline was for the most part an 
accidental phenomenon associated with the collapse of capital incomes,
1 rather than 
a spontaneous, two-sector, Kuznets-type process.
2 In particular, the only reason why 
top income shares dropped between 1914 and 1945 is that top capital incomes fell, 
whereas top wage shares remained approximately constant (see Figure 1). The 
wealth of the very rich was massively reduced by shocks in the first half of the 
twentieth century–these included war, inflation, and the Great Depression.  The very 
rich have never fully rebuilt their estates, probably because of the dynamic effects of 
progressive estate and income taxation on capital accumulation and pre-tax income 
inequality. A central limitation of these top income and wage shares series is they 
begin late--just before WWI. The modern progressive income tax was created around 
1913 in most countries, and there is no systematic data source on incomes prior to 
this date.
3 Although these series strongly suggest that the 1914-1945 shocks played 
the key role, one cannot fully exclude the possibly of a pre-existing, Kuznets-type 
downward trend in inequality prior to World War I. Constructing wealth concentration 
series covering both the nineteenth and the twentieth century allows us to put the 
1914-1945 period into a broader historical perspective. 
 
                                            
1 See Piketty (2003). For similar series covering the U.S., see Piketty and Saez (2003). 
2 According to Kuznets’ influential hypothesis (Kuznets (1955)), income inequality should have 
declined spontaneously in advanced capitalist countries, as more and more workers join the high-
paying sectors of the economy. 
3 The modern income tax was introduced in 1909 in the U.K in 1913 in the U.S., and 1914 in France.  
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Insert Figure 1 
A second and equally important goal is to understand the origins of the high 
levels of inequality that we know prevailed on the eve of World War I.  One can 
consider two extreme hypotheses. The first would suggest that these high levels 
were longstanding—the result of the political structures of societies where the 
primary form of wealth was land. The second is that capitalism, and in particular the 
interconnection between financial development and industrial growth created new 
forms of wealth whose distribution was radically unequal.  We thus aim to measure 
both the level of inequality that prevailed prior to the onset of industrialization and the 
changes that modernization brought forth. Luckily for us, the 1850s form a convenient 
turning point since industrialization accelerated under the Second Empire (1852-
1870) and the stock market boomed. 
Our series can also be used to address the on-going debate about the impact 
of inequality on growth. Economists now realize that cross-country regressions of 
inequality on growth are unlikely to deliver robust conclusions, due to poor data 
quality and serious identification problems (Banerjee and Duflo 2001, Atkinson and 
Brandolini 2001). Existing cross-country data sets on inequality suffer from serious 
limitations: they typically do not distinguish between income and wealth distribution, 
they are not homogenous across countries, and they are generally only available for 
a small number of isolated years for each country. We believe that one first needs to 
construct homogenous, long run series for individual countries before the general 
issue can be properly re-addressed. In the meantime, careful case studies with good 
data are probably more informative than cross country regressions with bad data. 
Our micro samples of estate tax returns also allow us to investigate the efficiency 
implications of inequality in a different way, by looking at how the age and gender 
profile of wealth varies with the level of asset concentration.   
Finally, French historical sources on wealth distribution are perhaps the richest 
in the world and ideal to investigate long term changes in inequality. As early as 1791 
the French National Assembly introduced a universal estate tax, and this tax (and the 
corresponding returns) has remained virtually unchanged since then. This estate tax 
was universal because it applied at any level of wealth and for nearly all types of 
property (both real and estate).
4 The successors of all decedents with positive wealth 
                                            
4 The one glaring exception was government bonds, which were exempted until 1850.  
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were required to file an estate tax return. The estate tax was made progressive in 
1902 (it was strictly proportional from 1791 to 1902), which prompted the French tax 
administration to start compiling summary tabulations of all individual estate tax 
returns.
5 These tabulations provide information about the number and value of 
estates in given wealth ranges. No such tabulations were compiled prior to 1902. 
However the tax authorities transcribed individual returns in register that have been 
preserved. We used these registers to collect large samples of individual returns 
between 1807 and 1902. We then constructed homogenous estimates of wealth 
concentration in Paris and France from 1807 to 1994 (see below for more details on 
the data and methodology). 
Other scholars have attempted to use these sources to examine the evolution 
of inequality in France and in Paris.
6 In particular, Daumard led a research group that 
examined a few cross sections of estate returns (1821, 1847, and 1911) in a small 
number of cities in France. Although the data collected was extraordinarily detailed, 
the intervals between samples were very long. Hence her work does not uncover the 
evolution of inequality prior to WWI.  Another project follows the descendants of all 
couples marrying in France between 1800 and 1830 and whose family name started 
with the letters “TRA” up to 1940. While this approach yields critical information about 
the intergenerational transmission of wealth within the broad population, the sample 
size is too small to study the very wealthy. In fact, the TRA survey contains too few 
observations to deliver reliable estimates above the 95th percentile of the distribution 
(which is unfortunate, because this is where most of the wealth lies).
7   
In other countries direct and homogeneous evidence on the evolution of 
inequality is even scarcer than in France.  For instance, the U.K. did not see a 
universal estate tax before 1894, and the U.S waited until 1916. As a result, 
                                            
5 Prior to 1902 the tax on estates that devolved to children was a flat 1%. In 1902 when the tax 
became progressive the top marginal rate was 5%, by mid 1930s it was 35%, it remains today at 40% 
(see Piketty 2001a, appendix J). 
6 Many have relied on indirect information. For instance, Morisson and Snyder (2000) produced 
income inequality estimates for in France over the long run that are rather problematic (see also 
Morisson 2000). Their Old Regime fiscal sources stop in 1789. They construct a measure of inequality 
for the nineteenth century out of a macro-economic argument about payments to factors which has 
little empirical ground; and they have no way of connecting the Old Regime series to the nineteenth 
century estimates. Finally their nineteenth century estimates are completely at variance with the direct 
evidence we present here. 
7 The TRA survey can be used for other purposes, however. For instance, Bourdieu, Postel-Vinay and 
Suwa-Eisenmann (2003) use the TRA survey to measure the evolution of the fraction of poor 
decedents (i.e. decedents with zero or near-zero wealth), and they find that this fraction has been 
increasing in nineteenth century France (see below).  
  5
homogenous wealth concentration series based upon estate tax returns can only 
cover the twentieth century in those two countries.
8 There do exist various alternative 
sources for wealth at death prior to 1894/1916 in the U.K. and in the U.S., in 
particular probate records. The information provided by probate records, however, is 
neither as rich nor as systematic as that contained in estate tax returns (in particular, 
probate records were purely voluntary, and all types of property were not covered).
9  
Consequently, it is very difficult to compare in a precise manner the probate-based 
estimates of wealth concentration available for the 18
th-nineteenth centuries and the 
modern estimates available for the twentieth century. All available estimates confirm 
that wealth concentration rose during the nineteenth century and dropped during the 
first half of the twentieth century. In contrast, there is little evidence as to the course 
of inequality in the late nineteenth century. Had it started to decline as Kutznets 
would have thought? Did it stabilize? Did it keep increasing until World War I?
10 Our 
French series allow us to cast new light on this central issue because they are 
homogenous over the 1807-1994 period. 
  Our main conclusions are the following. First, wealth concentration in Paris 
and in France increased up to World War I, with an acceleration (rather than a 
stabilization) of the trend at the end of the period. The bulk of the rise in inequality 
actually took place during the 1860-1913 period. This was largely driven by the 
growth of large industrial and financial estates and coincided with the decline of 
aristocratic fortunes. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the share of 
aristocrats in top estates actually rose. Next, the decline in wealth concentration 
observed after World War I appears to have been driven by the 1914-1945 shocks 
rather than by a two-sector, Kuznets-type process. The decline in inequality was not 
due to a reduction in the gap between Paris and the provinces since it occurred both 
in Paris and in the rest of France. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the very 
                                            
8 The standard references are Atkinson and Harrison (1978) for the U.K. and Lampman (1962) for the 
U.S.. Atkinson and Harrison use estate tax returns tabulations covering the 1923-1972 period to 
compute top wealth share series (the tabulations compiled by the U.K. tax administration over the 
1894-1914 period are less rich and do not allow for the same computations as the post-1923 tables). 
Lampman uses estate tax returns tabulations covering the 1922-1956 period to compute top wealth 
share series (these series have been updated by various authors). See Lindert (2000) for a recent 
survey. 
9 In particular, real estate was not probated in the U.K. before 1898 (realty and personalty were also 
treated differently in U.S. probate records). For estimates of wealth concentration in the U.K. based on 
eighteenth and nineteenth century probate records, see Lindert (1986). For corresponding estimates 
for Colonial America, see Jones (1977). 
10 See e.g. the survey by Lindert (2000).  
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high levels of wealth concentration observed at the eve of World War I seem to have 
been associated with retired individuals who had lived off capital income (henceforth 
rentiers) rather than with active entrepreneurs. In particular, the age wealth profile of 
decedents is markedly steeper around 1900-1913 than in other periods. Top wealth 
holders were very old at the turn of the last century (their 70s and 80s), whereas they 
are usually in their 50s in other periods, both at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and at the end of the twentieth century. Although our data does not allow us 
to evaluate the inefficiency of wealth concentration directly, these results shed new 
light on the ongoing debate about inequality and growth. That is, to the extent that 
credit constraints were important in 1900 France (which we cannot prove directly with 
our data), our findings about the changing age profile of wealth suggest that high 
wealth concentration might have been associated with lower growth.
11 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data 
sources and outlines our methodology. Section 3 presents our estimates of wealth 
concentration and composition at death in Paris. Section 4 discusses how the 
nineteenth century Paris estimates can be extended to the rest of France and 
presents preliminary results for wealth concentration at death in France from 1807 to 
1994. Section 5 shows how our data on wealth and age at death can be used to 
estimate series on wealth concentration among the living, using the estate multiplier 
method. Section 6 examines age-wealth profiles and discusses the efficiency 
implications of high wealth concentration. 
 
2. Data Sources 
 
 All of our estimates are based upon estate tax returns. As noted above, the 
estate tax was created in 1791, and it became a progressive tax in 1902. Since then 
the tax administration has periodically compiled tables indicating the number of 
decedents and the value of their estate for a large number of estate brackets. These 
tables were already used by Piketty (2001a, 2003), and they are available over the 
                                            
11 One way to test directly for the efficiency impact of high wealth concentration would be to look at 
investment patterns across wealth fractiles and age groups (i.e. to which extent older wealth holders 




12 They were compiled and published by département 
(départements are middle level administrative jurisdictions; there are about 90 of 
them in France, including Paris).
13 These tables can be used to study the evolution of 
wealth concentration both in France and in Paris during the twentieth century, using 
standard Pareto interpolation techniques. 
Prior to 1902, the tax administration only published the aggregate amount of 
wealth reported on estate tax returns, broken down by real (structures and buildings) 
and personal (furniture, businesses, stocks, bonds, etc.) assets. Studying 
concentration thus required collecting our own samples of individual returns. 
Collecting information on every individual return from every département for a given 
year was impossible. It would have required going to the archives of each 
département to access the tax registers and then dealing with hundreds of thousands 
of declarations a year. We therefore had to devise a sampling strategy. One option 
was to randomly select (e.g. on the basis of birth dates or family names) a nationally 
representative sample of decedents for various years during the nineteenth century. 
The problem is that the sample would need to be extremely large if it is to include 
enough large estates (given that wealth is extremely concentrated, it is critical to 
observe many of the very wealthy). 
  Therefore we decided to pursue a completely different strategy. We collected 
estate tax return information for all decedents in Paris for selected years (1807, 1817, 
1827, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1867, 1877, 1887, and 1902). We chose Paris because a 
disproportionate share of the very rich lived there. As one can see from Table 1, the 
annual number of decedents (aged 20-years-old and over) in Paris was about 12,000 
around 1800-1810 (2.5% of the French total) and nearly tripled during the nineteenth 
century, up to about 35,000 around 1900-1910 (6.5% of the French total). However 
only 30% of decedents in Paris had a positive estate during the nineteenth century 
                                            
12 These tabulations were published in the official statistical publications of the French Finance 
Ministry (for exact references and page numbers see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J)). The basic national 
tabulation indicating the number of decedents and amount of their estate for a large number of estate 
brackets is available for the following years: 1902-1913 (except 1906 and 1908), 1925-1960 (except 
1928 and 1934), 1962 and 1964. The French tax administration stopped compiling such tables in 
1964, but micro-files including large national samples of estate tax returns are available for 1984 and 
1994 (in the present paper, we only used the 1994 micro-file). 
13 Tables by estate brackets are availlable at the département level for the following years: 1902-1913 
(except 1906 and 1908), and 1925-1958 (except 1928 and 1934); for other years tables by estate 
brackets are only available at the national level. In addition, national tables broken down by estate 
brackets and age of decedents are available for years 1943-1954. The 1994 micro-file also allows us 
to break down the data by département and age for year 1994.  
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(about twice as small as for the rest of France),
14 so we only needed to collect 
detailed information on 3,500 decedents or so per year at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century and 10,000 or so decedents per year at the end.  Although Paris 
had more decedents with zero wealth than the rest of the country, the average estate 
was about 4.5 times larger in Paris than elsewhere in France during the nineteenth 
century.
15 It is particularly striking to notice that this ratio actually increased over time, 
in spite of the fact that Paris nearly tripled in population.
16 On the eve of World War I, 
the estates of Paris decedents made up over 26% of the French total (see Table 1 
and Figure 2). 
 
Insert Table 1 
Insert Figure 2 
 
A second problem that we had to overcome is that the registers provide 
information on tax returns rather than estates.  Hence to reconstruct estates we had 
to aggregate returns.
17 The very high levels of inequality in Paris again came to our 
assistance. By collecting nominal information on the top 10% of returns we were able 
to successfully attribute 92% of movable assets and 97% of real assets to specific 
individuals.  The remaining returns were treated as individuals—thus biasing 
downwards our inequality estimates. 
Our 1902 Paris sample is fully consistent with the table compiled for the same 
year for Paris by the tax administration. Therefore we can link up our 1807-1902 
Paris files with the 1902-1994 Paris tables to construct homogenous 1807-1994 
series for inequality in Paris. The more difficult part is the construction of estimates 
for wealth concentration for France from 1807 to 1902 from the Paris data. To do so 
                                            
14 In 1902 (when the first administrative tabulations start), the fraction of decedents with positive 
wealth was about 30% in Paris and 60% for the all of France. Estimates from the TRA survey suggest 
that the fraction of decedents with positive wealth in France declined from about 70% at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century to about 60% at the beginning of the twentieth century (see Bourdieu et al 
(2003)).  
15 Average estates, as well as top estate fractiles, are always defined in this paper over the set of all 
decedents aged 20-year-old and over, including those with zero wealth.  
16 Note that there is a discontinuity in the growth of Paris during the nineteenth century, as new 
districts (“arrondissements”) previously registered in the suburb were integrated into the city of Paris in 
1860. The results reported here do not make any correction for this discontinuity, which explains the 
discontinuity observed on some of the figures around 1860. 
17 An individual estate may lead to multiple returns for two broad reasons. First, prior to 1902 real 
estate was assessed in the bureau where it was located.  Hence descendents owners of real estate in 
multiple fiscal bureaus filed multiple declarations. Second, any adjustment to the first return leads to 
another return—adjustments are sometime substantial.   
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we must estimate how the relative importance of Paris in each top estate class 
evolved over the nineteenth century.  To achieve this goal, we used other estate 
surveys,
18 as well as non-estate fiscal sources (see section 4 below).  
  
3. Wealth Concentration at Death in Paris, 1807-1994 
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of wealth concentration at death in Paris over the 
from 1807 to 1994. Given that the richest decile accounts for at least 95% of the 
value of all assets during the nineteenth century (see Table 2), we focus on the top 
1%. The richest one percent of Parisians appears to have held a stable and very high 
fraction of all assets during the first half of the nineteenth century (better than half). 
The 1817 spike was short-lived and was due not to a large increase in the size of top 
estates, but rather to a large decline in modest estates (which apparently suffered the 
most from Napoleonic wars).
19 Inequality in Paris increased substantially after 1867 
with the top one percent’s share of wealth at death climbing from about 52% to over 
72% in 1913. World War I and the ensuing shocks then prompted an abrupt decline. 
The top 1% share dropped by almost 40 percentage points between 1913 and 1947-
1956, and by about 10 percentage points between 1947-1956 and 1994. Converting 
these wealth-at-death concentration estimates into wealth-of-the-living concentration 
estimates (using the estate multiplier method) leaves this general picture unchanged 
(see Section 5 below). 
 
Insert Table 2 
Insert Figure 3 
 
 Who were the individuals who enjoyed such a substantial increase in their 
relative wealth between 1867 and 1913? For the most part, their fortunes derived 
                                            
18 In addition to the TRA survey (which gives a reliable picture of the national distribution up to the 
90
th-95
th percentile), we should mention the study by Daumard (1973), which relied on samples of 
estate tax returns collected in five French cities at the beginning and at the end of the nineteenth 
century (we shall come back on this important work below). 
19 Other spikes in the top 1% share are due for the most part to the volatility of the very top estates 
(the top 0,1% share, and mostly the top 0,01% share – note that with about 20 000 decedents per 
year in Paris, the top 0,1% fractile includes only 20 decedents, and the top 0,01% only 2 decedents, 
so that the estimates for these fractiles are unstable. They depend on the identity the very wealthy 
individuals who happened to die in a specific year). The figures reported here are the raw figures, with 
no adjustment whatsoever for this top wealth volatily. Note however that the 1867-1913 upward trend 
is highly significant and does not rely on a small number of very top wealth holders.  
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from large industrial and financial estates. As Figure 4 illustrates, the share of 
personal (non-real) estate has always been a U-shaped function of wealth. This 
reflects the well-known fact that real estate is a middle class asset: the poor are too 
poor to own land or buildings; what little they have is in furniture, cash, or other 
moveables.  In contrast, the rich hold most of their wealth in stocks and bonds. What 
is more interesting is that during the nineteenth century the relative importance of 
personal wealth in Parisian estates also followed a U-shaped curve over time. This 
was especially true for the very wealthy (see Figures 4 and 5) where real assets 
became more and more important from 1807 to 1837. Real estate then entered a 
relative decline after 1837 that accelerated after 1867.   
The ebb and flow of the relative importance of real estate was linked to Paris’ 
recovery from the Revolution.  Prior to the Revolution, the peripheral parts of the city 
had been a maze of convents, monasteries and educational institutions all belonging 
to the Church.  When the wealth of the Church was nationalized these real estate 
assets were abruptly put on the private market, creating a glut of buildings and low 
prices.   As building and land values recovered, the relative importance of real estate 
grew, before being overshadowed by the financial boom of the last part of the 
century.   
The share of aristocratic decedents among the very rich follows an inverted U 
over the nineteenth century (see Figure 6). 
20 That is, nobles became more and more 
numerous in top wealth fractiles from 1807 to 1837-1847, and then the trend 
reversed during the second half of the nineteenth century. Note that the number of 
aristocrats remains high throughout the period, including in 1902 (about 13% of 
nobles in the top 1% estates, over 25% in the top 0.1%, vs. about 0.5-1% in the 
population as a whole). The inverted-U pattern is yet another of the Revolution’s 
legacies. In 1807, when we first observe it, aristocratic wealth was at a temporary 
nadir. On the one hand, the nobility was impoverished by the Revolution’s inflation 
and by the sharp decline of the value of Parisian real estate.  On the other hand, part 
of the Old Regime nobility was in exile and thus, if they died, we do not observe their 
movable wealth.  Aristocrats were able to recoup part of their losses during the first 
half of the nineteenth century.  Napoleon provided some assistance by ennobling his 
                                            
20 We take a very broad view of aristocrats, they include the Old-Regime nobility, the members of the 
elite who were given titles by Napoleon and anyone who had the fortune to create an aristocratic entail 
under the Bourbons (1815-1830).  
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chief military officers and endowing them with wealth. Later, the Restoration 
government (1815-1830) compensated individuals who had chosen exile during the 
Revolution for the losses they suffered when their property was confiscated. The 
government distributed nearly one billion francs in the famous “milliard des Emigrés” 
(Gain 1928).  The beneficiaries of Napoleon’s and the Restoration’s largess appear 
among the very rich until mid-century. Presumably such redistribution did not 
contribute to accelerate French industrialization. 
 
Insert Figure 4 
Insert Figure 5 
Insert Figure 6 
 
4. From Paris to France 
 
We can use the Paris data to construct wealth concentration at death 
estimates for all of France from 1807 to -1902. To do so we need to know the 
evolution of the share of Paris estates in top estates. Between 1902 and 1994, the 
evolution of top estate shares in France has been parallel to that of top estate shares 
in Paris: the levels of concentration have always been lower for the country as a 
whole, but the trends are similar (see Figure 7). It is also striking to note that the 
fraction of Paris estates in the top 1% estates has remained fairly stable over the 
twentieth century (it fluctuates between 20% and 25%, with no trend), even though 
Paris’ share of all decedents has been dwindling over time, reflecting the population 
decline of the capital (see Table 3). In 1902, Paris decedents were 4 times more 
likely to belong to the national top 1% estates than average decedents 
(26.6/6.5=4.1); in 1994, Paris decedents were 7 times more likely to belong to the 
national top 1% estates than average decedents (25.2/3.6=7.0). If anything, the 
geographic concentration of fortunes was larger at the end of the twentieth century 
than at the beginning of the twentieth century. The decline of wealth concentration 
that took place during the twentieth century was not due to redistribution between 
Paris and the provinces. 
  How did the fraction of Paris estates in top estates evolve over the course of 
the nineteenth century? Our benchmark estimates rely on a simple and very 
conservative assumption: from 1807 to 1902 Paris’ share of estates in the top  
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percentile increased at the same rate as Paris’ share of French adult deaths (see 
Table 3).  Using this approximation and our Paris samples of individual tax returns we 
compute the threshold wealth levels for the top percentiles of the national wealth 
distribution (e.g. P99, P99.5, P99.9 and P99.99).
21  We also calculate the average 
wealth levels for the relevant wealth classes (e.g. P99-99.5, P99.5-99.9, P99.9-99.99 
and P99.99-100). These are then weighted by the number of individuals in France in 
that wealth class in order to compute the average wealth levels for top fractiles (P99-
100, P99.5-100, P99.9-100 and P99.99-100). Lower thresholds of the national wealth 
distribution (P90 and P95) were computed using the national TRA survey.
22  
The national top estate shares estimates reported on Table 4 were computed 
using this methodology. They suggest that wealth concentration (as measured by the 
top 1% estate share) rose throughout the nineteenth century in France, both during 
the 1807-1867 and 1867-1902 periods, although less sharply than in Paris during the 
latter period (see Figure 7). These estimates are conservative in the sense that it is 
almost certain that they underestimate the rise of wealth concentration that took 
place during the nineteenth century. First, we know that the bulk of population growth 
in Paris during the nineteenth century was due to the annexation of suburbs in 1860 
and to population growth in these peripheral arrondissements.  Because the outskirts 
of the city were poor, the annexation added few top estates.  Thus, Paris’ share of 
top estates in France increased less than it’s share of the total population. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by nineteenth century housing tax tabulations showing that 
the fraction of Paris taxpayers in national top 1% taxpayers was substantially larger 
than 10% at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
23 Giving Paris a larger (and 
                                            
21 For instance, the number of decedents (aged 20 years old and over) in France was 583,976 in 1887 
(see Appendix Table A1), so that the top 1% of the estate distribution at deatlh consists of the top 
5,840 estates. If the share of Paris among French top 1% estates was 24.1% in 1887 (see Table 3), 
then the national P99 threshold for 1887 corresponds to the top 1,410 Parisian estates (0.241 x 5,840 
= 1,410) (the national P99 thereshold reported on Appendix Table A3 for 1887 was computed using 
this formula). 
22 See Bourdieu et al. (2003) for full details about the TRA survey. The P90 and P95 thresholds 
reported on Appendix Table A3 were computed using 10-year moving averages around the target 
years in order to make sure that the TRA sample includes sufficientely many observations. The P90-
95 and P95-99 intermediate wealth levels were computed using standard Pareto interpolation 
techniques. 
23 These tabulations were published in the same Finance Ministry official publications as the estate 
tabulations. We chose not to use them in our formal computations because the tax base of the 
housing tax (namely, the rental value of the real estate property where the household lives) is only 
loosely connected to the estate tax base (in particular, one cannot rule out the possibility that the 
housing tax base over-represents Paris-based taxpayers).  
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more realistic) share of top estates in 1807 would both reduce the share of wealth of 
the top 1% in France at that date and lead to more rapid rise in inequality over time. 
Next, and most importantly, other estate surveys are consistent with the view 
that our benchmark estimates provide are conservative.  Our estimates are in fact a 
lower bound for the increase in wealth concentration that took place in France during 
the nineteenth century. The important study by Daumard (1973), which relied on 
samples of estate tax returns collected in Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Lille, and Bordeaux 
found that wealth concentration rose in each of these five cities during the nineteenth 
century.
24  The TRA survey, although it is ill-suited for the study of top estates, is also 
consistent with our view. Wealth dispersion was on the rise in nineteenth century 
France according to the TRA survey, both in the sense that the fraction of decedents 
with positive estates declined over time (in spite of the sharp increase in the value of 
the average estate) and that ratios such as the P90/P50 ratio increased.
25 We also 
compared our benchmark national P99 series, extrapolated from our Paris samples, 
and the national P99 series computed using the TRA survey. We found that both 
series display the same overall upward trend in concentration (which is reassuring 
regarding the general validity of our Paris-France extrapolation technique), except 
that the increase in inequality from 1807 to 1902 period is even larger with the TRA 
series than with our series. (This again suggests that the latter provide a conservative 
lower bound for the upward trend in wealth concentration.)
26  
 
Insert Table 3 
Insert Table 4 
Insert Figure 7 
 
 
5. From the Wealth of the Decedents to the Wealth of the Living 
 
The estimates reported so far refer to the distribution of wealth among 
decedents, as described in the tax returns filled by their heirs.  However, the 
                                            
24 Unfortunately, Daumard’s samples are not available in machine-readable format, she has only two 
or three years of data for each city, and she did not try to compute homogenous inequality indicators 
(top fractiles shares, etc.) with her data. Thus her results, though fully consistent and complementary 
with our results, cannot be directly compared to ours. 
25 See Bourdieu et al (2004). 
26 See Appendix Figure A1.  
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evolution of wealth distribution among the living might possibly have followed a 
different pattern. In order to convert wealth-at-death concentration estimates into 
wealth-of-the-living concentration estimates, the standard technique is the so-called 
“estate multiplier” method.
27 It consists of weighting each observation of an estate at 
death by the inverse of the mortality rate for this age group. That is, if the mortality 
rate of living individuals aged 20 to 24 year-old is 0.68% in Paris in 1902, then each 
decedent aged 20-24 represents about 147 living individuals aged 20-24 
(1/0.0068=147). Conversely, if the mortality rate of living individuals 80 or more years 
old is 21.43% in Paris in 1902, each decedent in that group represents about 4.7 
living individuals aged 80+ (1/0.2143=4.7).  This method requires mortality tables 
(these are easily available) and estate tabulations broken down by estate size and 
age at death (these are scarcer).  Fortunately, our 1807-1902 micro samples of 
Parisian estates include age at death, the city’s statistical bureau published annual 
death by age totals, and the French censuses report the age distribution for the 
capital every five years.  These data allowed us to compute the estimates of wealth 
concentration among the living over the period 1807-1902 (see Figure 8). The base 
population for the living is the set of all individuals aged 20 and over. 
 
Insert Figure 8 
 
The upward trend in wealth concentration among decedents is also found 
among the living (Figure 8). Inequality was slightly higher among the living than 
among decedents.  Indeed, survivors were on average younger than those who die, 
and the young were on average poorer.  Changes over time, however, are similar. 
Increased life expectancy over the course of the nineteenth century has only a small 
effect on the trends. In order to make the estate multiplier method more reliable, one 
would prefer to take into account differential mortality by wealth.  Doing so would 
require having access to mortality schedules based both on wealth and age; 
unfortunately these are not available.  We have nonetheless re-estimated wealth of 
the living using various assumptions about differential mortality.  Although adding 
                                            
27 This method was widely used in Britain and France in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries to compute the stock of total national wealth on the basis of estate tax data regarding the 
flow of wealth transmitted at death. Standard references using this technique in order to estimate the 
wealth distribution of the living on the basis of estate tax data tabulated by estate size and age at 
death include Atkinson and Harrison (1978) and Lampman (1962). For a more recent application of 
this technique, see Kopczuk and Saez (2004).   
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differential mortality produces different levels of inequality it does not affect the 
upward trend in concentration that appears on Figure 8.  Finally, we have applied the 
estate multiplier method to available data for 1947 and 1994. Overall the sharp 
decline in wealth concentration observed during the twentieth century (and especially 
between 1914 and 1945) is very robust. If anything, the decline appears to be even 




6. The Age Profile of Wealth and the Efficiency Costs of Wealth 
Concentration 
 
Can our data tell us something about the efficiency consequences of wealth 
concentration?  One could look directly at the correlation between inequality and 
growth rates as done in the cross-country regression literature.  Our French series 
(and  other similar series for developed countries) show a striking long-run pattern.  
Annual per capita growth rates were relatively low (1.1%) during the 1800-1914 
period, when wealth concentration was enormous (around 50% of total wealth for the 
top 1%), and they have been much higher (3.1%) during the 1945-2000 period, when 
wealth concentration has been more moderate (around 25% of total wealth for the 
top 1%). Needless to say, this does not prove that high wealth concentration had a 
negative causal impact on growth.  After all, post-1945 growth might have been 
higher had wealth concentration remained the same as in 1914.  The most one can 
conclude is that the very high levels of wealth concentration that prevailed before 
World War I were not necessary for long-run growth or development.  One can not 
derive any further conclusions from such aggregate comparisons (although this is is 
what the cross-country literature routinely does, using inequality data sets that are of 
much lower quality and comparability than the series used for the present case 
study). 
                                            
28 See Appendix Table A4. It is unfortunately not possible to construct complete series for wealth 
concentration among the living for the twentieth century, due to data limitations: tables broken down by 
estate brackets and age of decedents are available solely for years 1943-1954 and at the national 
level (no table broken down by estate brackets and age of decedents has ever been compiled at the 
département level, except in 1931 for Seine département: see Bulletin de la Statistique Générale de 
France octobre-décembre 1934), and the 1994 micro sample is not large enough to allow for a reliable 
application of the estate multiplier method at the Paris level. Thus the only wealth-of-the-living 
concentration estimates we provide for the twentieth century are national estimates for 1947 and 1994.   
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Another way to test for the efficiency implications of wealth concentration is to 
examine who is rich. With perfect credit markets, high levels of wealth concentration 
can be bad from a social justice viewpoint, but they entail no efficiency loss. With 
first-best credit, money flows towards the best entrepreneurs and investment 
projects. Because the return on capital does not depend on who owns it, the 
distribution of wealth has no effect on growth. When credit constraints bind, however, 
initial wealth matters, and high levels of inequality can hurt growth. Whether the loss 
is large or small depends on who owns the assets. If the rich are efficient investors 
(they know which projects to fund, etc.), then wealth concentration may even be 
useful. For instance, if inequality is high because a small group of talented and active 
entrepreneurs has accumulated a lot of capital and keeps re-investing it in profitable 
activities, then credit constraints entail little efficiency loss. Suppose, however, that 
credit constraints are severe and thus the rich tend to invest in their own activities. 
Because of diminishing returns these projects will have low marginal returns (relative 
to some of the unfunded projects of the poor). In this case increasing wealth 
concentration is likely to be bad. Indeed as capital becomes more closely held, fewer 
projects will be started and aggregate returns will be low. With lower levels of 
inequality more projects are started and both the marginal rate and average rate of 
return rise.  
On a second level, the existence of severe credit constraints implies that 
wealth transfers between the generations will have different efficiency consequences 
depending on the age of the recipients. If individuals receive bequests or inter-vivos 
transfers when they are young, they can earn high returns by starting new 
enterprises.  If, however, they receive them when they are old they are likely to park 
them in low return activities.  Hence we can learn about the efficiency of wealth 
concentration by considering the age profile of wealth. To do so, we must move up 
one generation and consider the age profile of wealth at death, because we do not 
observe the age of recipients of bequests only that of the decedent.  
We assume that individuals save to make bequests and, in the absence of 
credit constraints, the size of bequests increases as a function of age at a constant 
rate.  In this setting, increasing inequality has two consequences. Both tend to make 
the observed age wealth profile at death steeper. First, the ratio of health expenses 
to wealth will decline because the number of wealthy who are spending on health 
falls (this effect is likely to matter only when comparing relatively egalitarian with very  
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unequal societies).  More importantly, as inequality increases, bequests themselves 
are likely to become an important part of rich individuals’ wealth. That is, for the very 
rich, a large fraction of the inheritance passed on by a parent to a child will be 
composed of wealth the parent received from the grandparents.  To the extent that 
wealth prolongs life, increasing inequality will lead to bequests that are made by older 
and older decedents.  Hence age wealth profiles will become steeper as inequality 
increases even in the absence of credit constraints.  
Credit constraints would tend to put a kink in age wealth profiles. Young 
wealthy individuals invest their wealth in enterprises that are high return. But when 
they are older and can no longer actively manage their capital, they invest in lower 
return activities. In a society where wealth is equally distributed, we would thus 
expect age-wealth profiles to flatten out with age (the proportion of retirees increases 
with age).  When there are high levels of inequality, however this effect is offset by 
the multi-generational bequests that tend to be made by older individuals. The key 
questions are thus: who owns the wealth when wealth concentration is high? Were 
the rich active entrepreneurs or retired rentiers?  What assets did they own?  
A first pass at the data considers the gender breakdown of wealth.  In the 
nineteenth century, at low or even middling levels of wealth, individuals were quite 
likely to participate in the economy as wage earners, in a family enterprise, or even in 
household production. Among the rich, as wealth increased however, participation in 
the economy declined for both sexes but it declined more rapidly for women than for 
men.  Hence, the share of women in the top fractiles of wealth can serve as a proxy 
for the importance of rentiers in the economy.  It is an imperfect proxy because 
qualitative sources, at least, suggest that women stepped in to run family businesses 
when their husbands died, and did not necessarily surrender control when their 
children grew up; they also suggest that some businesses were run jointly by both 
spouses.  In our micro data the share of women in top estates takes its highest value 
on the eve of World War I.  This in turn is consistent with the view that when 
inequality reached its apex in France the share of wealth held by active agents (as 
opposed to rentiers and successors) was low. 
The data also reveal striking changes in the age profile of wealth over the 
1807-1994 period (see Table 5 and Figures 9 and 10). During the nineteenth century, 
at a time of high and rising wealth concentration, the very rich were getting older and 
older. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the French  
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Revolution, the richest individuals were those in their 50s: they were 100% richer on 
average than people in their 40s, 25% richer than those in their 60s, and 40% richer 
than those in their 70s and 80s. Little by little, this inverted-U shaped age-wealth 
pattern became a strongly monotonic pattern over the course of the nineteenth 
century. In the middle of the nineteenth century, people in their 60s, 70s and 80s 
were as rich (or a bit richer) as those in their 50s. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the richest individuals were the oldest individuals. In 1902, people in their 
60s bequeathed 70% more than those in their 50s, and those in their 70s and 80s 
140% more. On the eve of World War I, top wealth holders were old and likely to be 
retired. Unsurprisingly, they lost heavily from the shocks of the 1914-1945 period.  In 
1947 as well as in 1994, we are back to a pattern where the richest individuals are 
those in their 50s.  
 
Insert Table 5 
Insert Figure 9 
Insert Figure 10 
 
Another way to analyze the changing age-wealth relationship is to look at the 
profile of average age by top estate fractile (see Table 6). In 1807 and 1817, average 
age was virtually the same within the top 10% and the top 1% of estates (or even 
slightly declining). The average-age-per-fractile relationship becomes upward sloping 
during the nineteenth century, and by 1902 average age within the top 1% is almost 
6 years more than for the top 10%. The relationship becomes flat again in 1947 and 
downward-sloping in 1994.  
Insert Table 6 
 
Finally, one can apply the estate multiplier method (see Section 5 above) and 
analyze how wealth concentration by age group among the living has changed over 
the course of the nineteenth century. The general population in Paris did not become 
older during the nineteenth century: those aged 60 or more were about 15%of the 
population in 1817, and after 1847 they were about 10-11% (see Table 7 and Figure 
11).  However the share of total wealth owned by the elderly rose significantly as 
wealth distribution worsened. The wealth belonging to those aged 60 or more rose 
from about 25-30% of the total at the beginning of the nineteenth century to about 40- 
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45% by the end of the century (see Figure 11). The wealth share of those aged 70 or 
more doubled, from less than 10% to about 20% (see Figure 12).  
 
Insert Table 7 
Insert Figure 11 
Insert Figure 12 
Our evidence is rather preliminary, but it is consistent with dividing the last two 
centuries into three periods that each corresponds to a different setting for age-
wealth profiles. The decedents who died prior to 1837 had themselves inherited 
relatively little wealth, because the Revolution and subsequent disruptions had been 
very hard on the older generations. Further, the flat age wealth profile for individuals 
50 years old or more is consistent with the existence of credit constraints.  By the 
mid-nineteenth century the standard pattern of an increasing age wealth profile 
begins to reassert itself.  The growth of the financial sector did lead to a decline in 
credit constraints, but the rate of growth of estates by age is simply too high to be 
explained by such a phenomenon. By 1877, estates were getting larger faster at 
older ages than at younger ones—something that just eliminating credit constraints is 
unlikely to produce. Rather multi-generational wealth transmission at older ages 
among the very rich is a likely explanation.  After 1947 we seem to have returned to a 
situation quite like that of 1817. The persistence of a flat age wealth profile to 1994 is 
likely to be associated with two factors. First, in societies where income growth is 
rapid, absolute wealth accumulation is faster by younger cohorts than by older ones 
because their incomes are higher at every age. This is an important distinction 
between the nineteenth century and the twentieth. Further, high rates of estate 
taxation have no doubt discouraged bequests in favour of consumption or inter-vivos 
transfer both of which would flatten the observed age wealth profile. 
Clearly more information would be gained by examining wealth accumulation 
by cohorts and by seeking evidence about the extent to which large estates were 
formed as a result of inheritance or entrepreneurial activity.  The evidence we have 
presented so far emphasizes the importance of considering these issues over a long 





Evidence from wealth at death in Paris and in France over the last two 
centuries reveals three key patterns.  First wealth concentration has changed 
dramatically overtime. In 1807 the top one percent’s share of wealth (40% in France, 
50% in Paris) was twice as high as it would be in 1994 but substantially less than in 
1913 when it peaked above 55% in France and 70% in Paris.  Some of these 
changes were due to economic phenomena that have long been emphasized as 
creating inequality, namely industrialization and financial centralization. Yet the 
decline comes largely from adverse shocks, rather than economic convergence.   
These changes are of such magnitude that they are not sensitive to whether one 
examines wealth at death in Paris or in France, or whether one examines it directly 
rather than converting it to wealth of the living by an estate multiplier method. 
Our second key result is that there was a significant transition during the 
nineteenth century from an important role for real estate as a form of wealth to 
moveable assets as the key form of wealth for the very rich.  Similarly, the share of 
wealth held by aristocrats first rose and then was eclipsed by that of financiers and 
industrialists in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Hence mobility within this 
highly unequal society might have been quite high.  Yet this conjecture is tempered 
by our third finding, the wealthy were getting older over time, and older relative to 
less wealthy decedents.  Such aging among the very wealthy would have had 
negative consequences for growth if financial markets were imperfect.  This issue 
requires further investigation because an alternative hypothesis is that steeper age-
wealth profiles were the consequence of the growth of financial markets: as their 





This statistical appendix reports our detailed series in seven tables.  The 
tables also reference the data sources and should be self-explanatory.  
Table A1 reports basic summary statistics.  
Table A2 reports our series for top estate fractiles at death in Paris. These 
series were computed by using the data sources reported on Table A1.  
Table A3 reports our series for top estate fractiles at death in France. These 
series were computed by applying the methodology described in Section 4. The 
1902-1994 series originate from the national tabulations by estate brackets published 
by the Finance Ministry (and the Finance Ministry micro sample for 1994) and are 
identical to the complete set of twentieth century series reproduced on Tables A5 to 
A7. The 1807-1887 series were computed by using TRA survey estimates 
(thresholds P90 and P95),
29 and using our Paris survey samples along with the 
assumption that the fraction of Paris estates in national top 1% estates has increased 
during the 1807-1902 period in the same proportion as the fraction of Paris 
decedents in all decedents (thresholds P99 and above). 
Table A4 reports our series for top estate fractiles among the living in Paris 
(1807-1902) and in France (1947 and 1994). The 1807-1902 series were computed 
by applying the estate multiplier methodology to our Paris samples of estate tax 
returns, while the 1947 and 1994 estimates were computed by applying the estate 
multiplier methodology to the national tabulations broken down by estate bracket and 
age of decedents compiled by the Finance Ministry (1947) and extracted from the 
1994 Finance Ministry micro sample (1994).
30 
                                            
29 The TRA survey estimates are available only starting in 1827, and the 1807-1817 figures reported 
on Table A3 for P90 and P95 were computed by assuming the same 1827/1817 and 1817/1807 
growth rates as for the Paris P90 and P95 thresholds reported on Table A2. 
30 Note that the 1994 top estates estimates for the living reported on Table A4 are approximately 
consistent with the 1994 top wealth fractiles reported by wealth tax taxpayers (a wealth tax (“impôt sur 
la fortune” (ISF) was instituted in France in 1989 and currently requires all households with net wealth 
above 720 000 euros to file a wealth tax return, i.e. around 0,5-1% of all households; see Piketty 
(2001b, pp.202-203) for 1990-2000 annual series on top wealth fractiles computed from wealth tax 
returns micro files). The thresholds P99,5 and P99,9 thresholds reported on Table A4 are slightly 
below the ISF P99,5 and P99,9 thresholds, but this seems largely driven by the fact that estate tax 
returns refer to individual wealth whereas ISF returns refer to household wealth. This suggests that the 
estate multiplier methodology does a pretty good job (at least up to threshold P99,9; thresholds 
P99,99 seem to be underestimated by estate tax returns, but this might be due to the limited size of 
the 1994 sample, and/or to the large increase of inter vivos gifts).  
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Tables A5 to A7 report corrected complete 1902-1994 series for top estate 
fractiles at death in France. These series were computed using the national 
tabulations of estate tax returns by estate brackets published by the Finance Ministry 
(and the 1984-1994 micro samples released by the Finance Ministry). The 
corrections explaining why the current series reported on Tables A5 to A7 differ 
slightly from the series already published in Piketty (2001a, Appendix J, Tables J5 
(p.759), J7 (p.761) and J11 (p.765)) are the following: (1) the series reported in 
Piketty (2001a) were computed by assuming that the base population was 
permanently equal to 500 000, whereas the current series were computing by taking 
the exact number of decedents aged 20-year-old and over for each year (in practice 
this number fluctuates around 500 000, as one can see from Table A5); (2) estimates 
for 1984 and 1994 were corrected upwards in order to take into account the growth of 
inter vivos gifts during the 1980s-1990s; (3) finally, and most importantly, a correction 
was introduced in order to correct for the fact that a base exemption for low estates 
was introduced in 1956, so that a number of positive small estates disappear from 
the Finance Ministry tabulations in the 1956-1994 data (the level of the base 
exemption was adjusted less than inflation since 1956, so that the number of missing 
estates is small in 1984-1994, but large in 1956-1964); no such correction was made 
in the Piketty (2001) series, which explains why top estate shares suddenly increased 
in 1956.  
 
Insert Tables A1 to A7 
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(% Paris/France) (% Paris/France) (Ratio Paris/rest of France)
1807 11 622 3 691 31,8 2,5 8,3 3,60
1817 11 925 3 104 26,0 2,5 8,5 3,60
1827 14 151 3 817 27,0 2,8 9,5 3,60
1837 16 902 4 926 29,1 3,1 9,8 3,42
1847 18 169 4 814 26,5 3,3 11,5 3,86
1857 19 248 6 048 31,4 3,6 14,3 4,51
1867 26 844 7 971 29,7 4,9 16,7 4,12
1877 28 777 8 242 28,6 5,1 18,6 4,22
1887 34 411 9 815 28,5 5,9 20,1 4,01
1902 36 366 9 830 27,0 6,5 26,0 5,05
1913 35 677 11 927 33,4 6,5 26,6 5,23
1929 35 842 14 495 40,4 5,8 25,0 5,42
1938 30 274 16 013 52,9 5,3 17,3 3,76
1947 24 955 14 090 56,5 5,5 15,0 3,07
1956 27 940 16 053 57,5 5,5 15,9 3,24
1994 18 553 12 528 67,5 3,6 9,7 2,86
Table 1: Estate Tax Returns in Paris, 1807-1994 - Summary Statistics 
Source : Authors' computations using estate tax returns (see Table A1 for detailled series and sources)Top 10% Top 1% Top 0,1%
1807 95,9 51,1 18,1
1817 97,9 56,7 18,3
1827 97,5 52,3 16,9
1837 97,7 50,0 14,8
1847 98,3 55,8 21,3
1857 96,9 51,0 13,4
1867 96,8 52,4 16,0
1877 96,9 59,0 24,6
1887 97,1 55,5 20,1
1902 99,1 64,8 26,1
1913 99,6 72,1 32,8
1929 94,9 63,1 26,4
1938 90,4 53,6 24,1
1947 76,7 38,1 14,8
1956 75,0 34,6 11,7
1994 66,9 23,7 4,9
Table 2: Wealth Concentration at Death in Paris, 1807-1994
Source : Authors' computations using estate tax returns (see Table A2 for detailed series
Estate Share
and sources)Parisian Decedents
in all decedents 20-yr + in top 10% estates in top 1% estates in top 0,1% estates
%% % %
1807 2,5 10,1 20,5
1817 2,5 10,3 21,0
1827 2,8 11,6 23,7
1837 3,1 12,6 25,6
1847 3,3 13,3 27,1
1857 3,6 14,6 29,7
1867 4,9 19,9 40,4
1877 5,1 21,1 42,8
1887 5,9 24,1 49,1
1902 6,5 7,5 26,6 54,1
1913 6,5 7,5 25,5 52,3
1929 5,8 8,3 23,9 53,0
1938 5,3 7,4 21,6 42,1
1947 5,5 11,0 19,8 35,2
1956 5,5 12,8 22,3 35,0
1994 3,6 8,9 25,2 35,2
Table 3: The Fraction of Paris Estates in Top Estates at Death, 1807-1994
Source : Authors' computations using estate tax returns (see Table A1 for detailed sources)
 Parisian estatesTop 10% Top 1% Top 0,1%
1807 79,1 43,4 16,3
1817 81,0 44,5 18,1
1827 82,4 45,2 16,3
1837 79,6 43,8 14,7
1847 81,6 47,9 18,4
1857 82,9 49,5 17,4
1867 81,0 48,0 17,4
1877 83,8 47,1 20,1
1887 83,9 48,7 19,2
1902 83,9 51,6 23,1
1913 86,3 54,9 26,0
1929 82,0 50,2 24,7
1938 77,6 42,0 19,9
1947 69,9 29,9 11,0
1956 69,4 30,4 11,0
1994 61,0 21,3 6,3
Table 4: Wealth Concentration at Death in France, 1807-1994
Source : Authors' computations using estate tax returns (see Table A3 for detailed series)
Estate Share20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99
yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old
1817 48 49 49 100 80 70 70
1827 49 46 73 100 94 99 63
1837 67 79 107 100 112 123 102
1847 78 73 102 100 117 154 135
1857 78 77 101 100 104 102 111
1867 65 54 82 100 132 141 142
1877 56 62 63 100 205 262 340
1887 36 27 66 100 130 214 288
1902 30 40 80 100 169 239 251
1947 31 51 73 100 113 105 105 109
1994 11 45 100 87 93 95 68
Table 5: The Age Profile of Wealth at Death in Paris, 1817-1994
Source : Authors' computations using estate tax returns (see Table A1 for detailed
(average estate left by 50-59 yr-old = 100) 
sources)Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
Estates Estates Estates
1817 57,5 57,6 57,6
1827 61,7 61,9 60,6
1837 60,2 60,6 62,3
1847 61,2 61,4 62,9
1857 62,4 63,6 66,4
1867 62,4 62,3 66,1
1877 61,3 63,8 66,2
1887 62,1 64,6 68,0
1902 61,8 63,9 67,6
1947 67,0 67,4 68,4
1994 81,7 81,3 80,3
Table 6: The Age Profile of Wealth at Death in Paris, 1817-1994
Source : Authors' computations using estate tax returns (see Table A1
(average age within top fractiles) 
for detailed sources)20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80+
yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old yr-old
1817 28,8 23,5 18,2 14,7 10,0 3,9 0,9 100,0
1827 29,7 26,6 18,2 12,7 8,4 3,6 0,8 100,0
1837 30,3 29,1 18,1 11,1 7,1 3,4 0,8 100,0
1847 31,0 26,6 19,4 13,1 6,6 2,7 0,6 100,0
1857 31,1 27,7 19,1 12,6 6,4 2,6 0,6 100,0
1867 29,5 27,7 20,3 12,2 7,1 2,8 0,6 100,0
1877 29,9 26,2 20,7 13,3 6,8 2,6 0,6 100,0
1887 28,8 26,3 20,1 13,7 7,5 2,9 0,6 100,0
1902 29,3 26,8 20,1 12,9 7,4 3,0 0,6 100,0
1817 10,5 12,0 15,1 34,7 19,4 6,6 1,8 100,0
1827 7,9 15,4 19,2 32,2 17,3 7,1 1,0 100,0
1837 8,0 19,1 26,8 18,7 16,8 8,4 2,2 100,0
1847 8,8 15,0 20,4 24,2 19,1 9,8 2,7 100,0
1857 9,7 13,5 18,5 27,0 20,3 7,8 3,1 100,0
1867 9,7 10,1 18,9 20,8 26,2 11,1 3,2 100,0
1877 8,4 15,1 15,8 20,0 22,8 12,6 5,4 100,0
1887 6,8 6,2 19,0 26,1 20,1 15,5 6,3 100,0
1902 9,3 13,1 16,3 21,8 22,1 14,2 5,2 100,0
Table 7: Population and Wealth Shares by Age Groups among the Living in Paris, 1817-1902
Source : Authors' computations using estate tax returns (see Table A1 for detailed sources)
(average estate left by 50-59 yr-old = 100) 
Share in total living population (20 yr+) (%)







































































































































Source: Piketty (2003)  (computations based on income tax returns)
Top 1% income share (income distribution)































































































Paris share in total deaths 20-yr+(%) (left scale)
Paris share in total estate (%) (left scale)














































































Source: Authors' computations based on estae tax returns (see Table A2 for detailed series)
Top 1% estate shareFigure 4: Wealth composition at death in Paris, 1807-1902




























































Source: Authors' computations using  samples of estae tax returns collected in the Paris archives
1807
1847
1902Figure 5: Wealth composition at death in Paris and France, 1807-1902




















































Source: Authors' computations using samples of estae tax returns collected in the Paris archives 
and national aggregate esate statistiics comppiled by the French tax administration (see Table A1 for detailled sources)
France




















































Source: Authors' computations using samples of estae tax returns collected in the Paris archives
Share of aristocratic estate in total estate
Fraction of aristocratic estate in top 1%














































































Source: Authors' computations based on estae tax returns (see Tables A2 and A3 for detailed series)
Top 1% estate share (Paris)






















































Source: Authors' computations using samples of estae tax returns collected in the Paris archives (see Tables A2 et A4 for detailed series)
Top 1% estate share among decedents
Top 1% estate share among the livingFigure 9: The Changing Age Profile of Wealth at Death in Paris, 1817-1902


















































Source: Authors' computations using samples of estae tax returns collected in the Paris archives
1817
1857
1902Figure 10: The Changing Age Profile of Wealth at Death in Paris, 1902-1994























































Source: Authors' computations based on estae tax returns (see Table A1 for detailed sources)
1902
1947
















































Source: Authors' computations using samples of estae tax returns collected in the Paris archives
Share of 60-yr-old+ in total living population












































Source: Authors' computations using samples of estae tax returns collected in the Paris archives
Share of 70-yr-old+ in total living population
Share of 70-yr-old+ in total living wealthN. decedents N. estate>0 Average estate N. decedents N. estate>0 Average estate N. decedents N. estate>0 Average estate
20-yr + (all decedents) 20-yr + (all decedents) 20-yr + (all decedents)
1807 11 622 3 691 5 630 472 523 1 664 460 901 1 564
1817 11 925 3 104 5 205 472 559 1 541 460 634 1 446
1827 14 151 3 817 9 156 497 885 2 732 483 734 2 544
1837 16 902 4 926 9 718 549 661 3 049 532 759 2 838
1847 18 169 4 814 13 001 558 687 3 678 540 518 3 365
1857 19 248 6 048 16 619 540 469 4 146 521 221 3 686
1867 26 844 7 971 20 622 580 147 5 726 553 303 5 003
1877 28 777 8 242 28 708 559 555 7 931 530 778 6 805
1887 34 411 9 815 31 532 583 976 9 262 549 565 7 868
1902 36 366 9 830 34 068 559 810 363 612 8 525 523 444 353 782 6 750
1913 35 677 11 927 41 238 551 114 360 539 10 037 515 437 348 612 7 877
1929 35 842 14 495 111 067 617 073 388 620 25 758 581 231 374 125 20 497
1938 30 274 16 013 98 364 575 955 379 226 29 937 545 681 363 213 26 141
1947 24 955 14 090 424 427 457 611 308 526 153 793 432 656 294 436 138 184
1956 27 940 16 053 2 001 181 506 542 294 735 693 706 478 602 278 682 617 377
1994 18 553 12 528 922 704 511 467 326 213 343 938 492 914 313 685 322 154
Table A1: Estate Tax Returns in Paris and France, 1807-1994 - Summary Statistics 
Sources : N. decedents 20-yr +: Etat-Civil data (published in Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris  and Annuaire 
Paris France minus Paris France
N. estate>0 and average estate (all decedents) (Paris): 1807-1902: Samples of individual estate tax returns collected in the 
Paris archives; 1902-1956 :Tabulations of estate tax returns broken down by estate brackets and by département  published
by the French Finance Ministry (see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J)  for the exact references of the official publications where
Statistique de la France  (various issues))
compiled by the French tax administration (see Annuaire Statistique de la France 1966 - Résumé rétrospectif , p.530) (these
Notes : (1) Average estates are measured in current French francs. Average estates refer to gross estates for the years 
the raw tabulations were originally published); 1994 : National sample of individual estate tax returns released by
the French Finance Ministry (DMTG sample; see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J) ) 
N. estate>0 and average estate (all decedents) (France): 1807-1902: Annual aggregate series on total estate at death
1902-1994 : Same sources as above.
1807-1887, and to net estates for the years 1902-1994. In 1902, the aggregate (net estate)/(gross estate) ratio was equal to 
0,91, and was approximately uniform across estate brackets, so that shares of top factiles in total estate were virtually identical 
for gross estates and net estates (with a gap smaller than 1%; data available for other years confirm this finding)
series only include total estate, not the number of the positive estates; moreover they only cover the post-1826 period; for
1807 and 1817 we assumed the same average estate ratio between Paris and the rest of France as in 1827); 
compiled by the Finance Ministry on the basis of the Paris/Seine ratios observed for 1902 and 1925 (the Seine 
and Paris figures are virtually identical for top estates)
restricted to the city of Paris), and for 1913 we adjusted the figures reported in the Seine département tabulation
 (2) The 1902-1913 tabulations published by the French Finance Ministry are for the Seine département , which at that time
included a number of small suburban areas in addition to the city of Paris (the Seine départment was restricted to the city
of Paris in 1930, but the tabulations were compiled separately for the city of Paris and the rest of the Seine département
starting in 1925). For 1902 we used the samples collected in the Paris archives (our 1807-1902 samples are always N.decedents 
20yr+
P90 P95 P99 P99,5 P99,9 P99,99
1807 11 622 5 528 21 042 107 045 173 835 480 676 1 537 092
1817 11 925 3 189 16 508 111 077 194 001 560 272 1 673 222
1827 14 151 7 083 31 566 200 000 326 140 832 594 2 800 737
1837 16 902 6 640 34 999 223 060 337 324 911 212 2 050 398
1847 18 169 7 662 41 420 292 298 451 364 1 035 659 7 036 204
1857 19 248 12 967 59 030 383 920 642 116 1 467 529 3 518 833
1867 26 844 16 724 70 000 478 000 769 099 1 800 000 5 921 960
1877 28 777 21 775 86 453 567 179 943 135 2 662 118 10 790 010
1887 34 411 24 176 102 891 676 036 1 101 659 2 983 062 8 876 016
1902 36 366 14 579 78 725 699 908 1 315 321 3 858 350 15 612 250
1913 35 677 17 728 98 374 943 051 1 824 954 5 864 878 29 080 208
1929 35 842 91 734 267 470 2 010 258 4 138 735 12 958 419 45 125 326
1938 30 274 98 518 296 484 1 704 192 2 724 730 8 370 985 49 727 986
1947 24 955 518 506 1 515 198 5 567 321 10 736 513 26 927 847 89 128 090
1956 27 940 4 120 365 7 966 224 25 923 694 46 855 102 113 871 960 370 631 378
1994 18 553 2 474 223 3 753 231 11 738 945 17 735 520 36 162 276 66 656 928
P0-100 P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99,5-100 P99,9-100 P99,99-100
1807 5 630 54 007 96 553 287 955 437 353 1 017 156 3 015 668
1817 5 205 50 932 93 389 294 904 444 049 953 919 1 729 989
1827 9 156 89 305 162 848 478 395 698 148 1 546 431 3 466 819
1837 9 718 94 948 172 639 486 205 700 393 1 434 021 2 674 681
1847 13 001 127 780 235 881 725 321 1 086 630 2 773 768 9 451 051
1857 16 619 161 003 292 164 848 086 1 187 798 2 218 707 4 040 818
1867 20 622 199 618 363 605 1 080 749 1 567 401 3 293 999 8 167 825
1877 28 708 278 190 511 945 1 693 355 2 670 192 7 064 236 30 940 500
1887 31 532 306 053 560 499 1 749 732 2 641 286 6 340 549 19 957 840
1902 34 068 337 752 638 662 2 206 730 3 475 089 8 886 958 28 968 130
1913 41 238 410 701 798 065 2 973 333 4 821 543 13 508 606 53 957 581
1929 111 067 1 053 804 1 952 219 7 010 897 11 306 277 29 358 803 106 562 855
1938 98 364 889 149 1 602 691 5 276 548 8 436 354 23 719 021 124 319 966
1947 424 427 3 254 777 5 346 142 16 168 068 25 045 755 62 816 319 141 045 054
1956 2 001 181 15 016 227 24 590 728 69 227 908 102 960 308 233 595 673 760 309 092
1994 922 704 6 172 411 9 096 175 21 853 380 29 440 392 60 325 264 138 868 850
P0-100 P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99,5-100 P99,9-100 P99,99-100
1807 100,0 95,9 85,8 51,1 38,8 18,1 5,4
1817 100,0 97,9 89,7 56,7 42,7 18,3 3,3
1827 100,0 97,5 88,9 52,3 38,1 16,9 3,8
1837 100,0 97,7 88,8 50,0 36,0 14,8 2,8
1847 100,0 98,3 90,7 55,8 41,8 21,3 7,3
1857 100,0 96,9 87,9 51,0 35,7 13,4 2,4
1867 100,0 96,8 88,2 52,4 38,0 16,0 4,0
1877 100,0 96,9 89,2 59,0 46,5 24,6 10,8
1887 100,0 97,1 88,9 55,5 41,9 20,1 6,3
1902 100,0 99,1 93,7 64,8 51,0 26,1 8,5
1913 100,0 99,6 96,8 72,1 58,5 32,8 13,1
1929 100,0 94,9 87,9 63,1 50,9 26,4 9,6
1938 100,0 90,4 81,5 53,6 42,9 24,1 12,6
1947 100,0 76,7 63,0 38,1 29,5 14,8 3,3
1956 100,0 75,0 61,4 34,6 25,7 11,7 3,8
1994 100,0 66,9 49,3 23,7 16,0 6,5 1,5
Average estates in current French francs
Shares of top fractiles in total estate (%)
Sources : Authors' computations using the data sources described in Table A1
Table A2: Top Estates Fractiles at Death in Paris, 1807-1994  
Thresholds in current French francsP90 P95 P99 P99,5 P99,9 P99,99
1807 472 523 2 358 5 288 28 000 50 584 125 870 426 282
1817 472 559 1 845 4 136 21 900 42 484 132 833 420 134
1827 497 885 3 706 8 309 44 000 83 511 243 950 869 095
1837 549 661 3 965 7 820 51 511 94 320 249 171 593 805
1847 558 687 5 400 10 800 57 980 118 529 335 707 2 415 514
1857 540 469 5 777 11 701 82 600 152 400 462 327 1 174 056
1867 580 147 7 705 15 084 96 212 184 396 549 600 1 914 993
1877 559 555 8 520 18 110 115 916 217 600 653 654 2 805 886
1887 583 976 9 433 16 902 139 599 256 000 768 647 2 422 201
1902 559 810 9 533 28 853 115 609 235 832 833 103 3 570 181
1913 551 114 11 314 32 217 134 069 270 082 996 501 4 574 925
1929 617 073 40 825 78 286 359 117 656 827 2 204 242 10 275 526
1938 575 955 58 165 97 801 383 780 670 890 1 974 460 7 337 826
1947 457 611 307 120 571 709 1 876 162 3 194 471 7 682 274 26 845 396
1956 506 542 1 202 096 2 417 529 8 929 759 14 015 059 38 259 852 124 384 982
1994 511 467 860 155 1 258 239 3 770 233 5 343 627 12 257 300 33 410 881
P0-100 P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99,5-100 P99,9-100 P99,99-100
1807 1 664 13 159 23 344 72 247 110 939 271 633 831 864
1817 1 541 12 484 22 146 68 541 109 027 278 458 521 635
1827 2 732 22 507 39 928 123 573 190 584 445 486 1 031 595
1837 3 049 24 277 43 432 133 452 202 772 449 746 866 480
1847 3 678 30 023 53 296 176 102 275 156 677 984 2 386 187
1857 4 146 34 366 61 770 205 327 315 965 722 627 1 359 435
1867 5 726 46 383 83 216 274 614 425 133 997 977 2 556 102
1877 7 931 66 467 120 578 373 959 597 577 1 597 123 7 225 626
1887 9 262 77 717 143 013 451 141 712 066 1 782 972 5 797 036
1902 8 525 71 556 128 675 440 221 710 626 1 970 616 6 635 051
1913 10 037 86 594 156 983 551 092 901 135 2 612 763 10 351 818
1929 25 758 211 231 370 556 1 294 142 2 147 872 6 369 604 27 275 957
1938 29 937 232 379 390 731 1 257 821 2 040 936 5 969 784 28 702 172
1947 153 793 1 074 401 1 703 206 4 602 018 7 024 177 16 892 200 50 325 550
1956 693 706 4 816 758 7 805 313 21 072 257 31 425 065 76 235 341 227 396 983
1994 343 938 2 096 720 3 067 094 7 319 247 10 258 099 21 713 287 59 185 958
P0-100 P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99,5-100 P99,9-100 P99,99-100
1807 100,0 79,1 70,2 43,4 33,3 16,3 5,0
1817 100,0 81,0 71,9 44,5 35,4 18,1 3,4
1827 100,0 82,4 73,1 45,2 34,9 16,3 3,8
1837 100,0 79,6 71,2 43,8 33,3 14,7 2,8
1847 100,0 81,6 72,4 47,9 37,4 18,4 6,5
1857 100,0 82,9 74,5 49,5 38,1 17,4 3,3
1867 100,0 81,0 72,7 48,0 37,1 17,4 4,5
1877 100,0 83,8 76,0 47,1 37,7 20,1 9,1
1887 100,0 83,9 77,2 48,7 38,4 19,2 6,3
1902 100,0 83,9 75,5 51,6 41,7 23,1 7,8
1913 100,0 86,3 78,2 54,9 44,9 26,0 10,3
1929 100,0 82,0 71,9 50,2 41,7 24,7 10,6
1938 100,0 77,6 65,3 42,0 34,1 19,9 9,6
1947 100,0 69,9 55,4 29,9 22,8 11,0 3,3
1956 100,0 69,4 56,3 30,4 22,7 11,0 3,3
1994 100,0 61,0 44,6 21,3 14,9 6,3 1,7
Average estates in current French francs
Shares of top fractiles in total estate (%)
Sources : Authors' computations using the data sources described in Table A1 and the methodology described in secti
Table A3: Top Estates Fractiles at Death in France, 1807-1994  
Thresholds in current French francsN. living 20yr+ P90 P95 P99 P99,5 P99,9 P99,99
1807 493 316 3 971 14 975 91 390 138 014 347 792 1 641 388
1817 506 184 2 291 11 748 94 832 154 025 405 384 1 786 755
1827 574 089 5 206 22 428 144 455 220 475 519 002 4 132 900
1837 631 678 4 206 20 954 146 020 244 728 668 421 1 618 900
1847 784 417 4 036 22 200 177 188 337 962 662 801 1 765 905
1857 884 450 7 589 30 622 190 366 353 082 1 229 358 3 001 180
1867 1 320 324 10 087 34 914 224 000 431 949 1 107 527 5 921 960
1877 1 400 732 13 405 43 468 298 568 593 027 1 801 648 6 964 895
1887 1 638 710 13 433 47 710 329 494 694 695 1 959 653 5 381 267
1902 1 911 376 9 456 39 432 360 174 684 172 2 480 111 15 720 000
1947 (France) 28 286 718 263 815 488 166 1 415 808 2 230 392 5 649 847 18 467 416
1994 (France) 43 091 985 588 115 947 205 2 184 896 2 875 053 6 691 938 23 657 780
P0-100 P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99,5-100 P99,9-100 P99,99-100
1807 4 399 42 272 76 495 236 469 355 099 824 353 3 114 621
1817 4 067 39 865 73 988 242 176 360 536 773 103 1 786 755
1827 6 315 61 475 111 211 335 219 483 204 1 101 309 4 132 900
1837 6 405 62 610 114 832 348 240 505 574 1 107 985 1 912 682
1847 7 586 74 522 138 249 437 601 620 312 1 285 639 2 676 280
1857 9 877 95 560 174 873 582 483 904 759 1 921 827 3 001 180
1867 11 554 111 587 203 292 677 347 1 058 198 2 724 638 10 356 980
1877 15 401 148 702 272 138 942 591 1 468 490 3 435 867 10 121 720
1887 16 824 163 140 299 521 1 027 460 1 582 794 3 419 709 8 886 234
1902 19 388 190 342 360 270 1 329 257 2 168 190 5 957 852 15 742 750
1947 (France) 119 512 839 391 1 312 904 3 422 454 4 995 021 11 992 015 32 656 621
1994 (France) 212 622 1 366 427 1 964 334 4 297 833 6 167 309 14 539 004 29 026 300
P0-100 P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99,5-100 P99,9-100 P99,99-100
1807 100,0 96,1 86,9 53,8 40,4 18,7 7,1
1817 100,0 98,0 91,0 59,5 44,3 19,0 4,4
1827 100,0 97,3 88,1 53,1 38,3 17,4 6,5
1837 100,0 97,8 89,6 54,4 39,5 17,3 3,0
1847 100,0 98,2 91,1 57,7 40,9 16,9 3,5
1857 100,0 96,8 88,5 59,0 45,8 19,5 3,0
1867 100,0 96,6 88,0 58,6 45,8 23,6 9,0
1877 100,0 96,6 88,4 61,2 47,7 22,3 6,6
1887 100,0 97,0 89,0 61,1 47,0 20,3 5,3
1902 100,0 98,2 92,9 68,6 55,9 30,7 8,1
1947 (France) 100,0 70,2 54,9 28,6 20,9 10,0 2,7
1994 (France) 100,0 64,3 46,2 20,2 14,5 6,8 1,4
Average estates in current French francs
Shares of top fractiles in total estate (%)
Sources : Authors' computations using the data sources described in Table A1 and the methodology described in section 
Table A4: Top Estates Fractiles among the Living in Paris, 1807-1902  
Thresholds in current French francsN.decedents 20yr+ N. estates>0 P90 P95 P99 P99,5 P99,9 P99,99
1902 559 810 363 612 9 533 28 853 115 609 235 832 833 103 3 570 181
1903 555 829 386 032 10 077 29 522 120 787 246 837 938 665 3 179 368
1904 560 314 381 601 10 014 28 610 121 562 246 832 901 625 4 450 804
1905 580 460 385 019 10 111 28 620 123 753 253 824 934 441 4 429 150
1907 612 300 401 574 10 355 29 662 123 000 249 972 925 426 4 193 256
1909 594 163 379 418 10 724 29 792 124 956 258 083 980 569 4 935 528
1910 549 464 359 836 10 931 31 546 128 971 268 832 1 014 789 4 209 416
1911 583 163 359 113 10 662 30 319 127 227 259 710 980 740 4 004 125
1912 546 776 358 921 11 017 31 258 128 349 263 209 986 846 4 524 669
1913 551 114 360 539 11 314 32 217 134 069 270 082 996 501 4 574 925
1925 585 355 385 943 32 260 62 173 231 393 418 330 1 369 248 5 245 321
1926 583 217 403 990 35 596 67 924 262 486 474 965 1 647 835 7 084 458
1927 562 847 381 456 37 670 72 478 283 579 522 430 1 838 216 8 390 437
1929 617 073 388 620 40 825 78 286 359 117 656 827 2 204 242 10 275 526
1930 546 298 357 240 45 181 88 202 387 253 735 356 2 481 742 11 532 757
1931 580 407 372 183 46 098 89 934 373 265 709 100 2 205 120 9 603 289
1932 562 864 370 999 45 117 87 110 374 203 685 694 2 097 144 9 261 477
1933 571 738 354 147 44 258 85 119 360 702 665 485 1 987 701 10 676 624
1935 581 498 370 150 43 263 83 215 344 192 615 970 1 902 986 7 441 802
1936 567 724 362 638 43 297 82 405 330 922 608 073 1 765 910 6 502 196
1937 556 956 361 328 46 202 88 130 376 670 694 507 1 942 174 8 578 674
1938 575 955 379 226 58 165 97 801 383 780 670 890 1 974 460 7 337 826
1939 554 525 330 696 60 089 100 899 398 349 690 491 2 008 422 8 016 276
1940 659 709 296 633 56 184 88 902 329 833 493 231 1 384 717 5 131 485
1941 594 252 346 213 77 204 152 334 467 099 757 184 2 107 200 7 598 864
1942 587 115 354 581 94 563 193 640 704 581 1 072 524 2 988 552 10 461 455
1943 546 105 332 276 118 232 248 228 933 468 1 630 835 4 550 520 16 485 205
1944 584 184 313 250 150 925 246 423 911 634 1 536 372 4 534 291 17 407 819
1945 549 212 318 693 186 777 348 054 1 105 394 1 809 654 5 111 592 19 290 026
1946 462 058 285 230 241 183 441 847 1 452 376 2 160 214 5 746 834 21 260 093
1947 457 611 308 526 307 120 571 709 1 876 162 3 194 471 7 682 274 26 845 396
1948 448 686 284 264 419 442 670 566 2 241 028 3 724 553 9 033 850 31 740 465
1949 504 031 287 669 464 344 846 621 2 568 783 4 206 184 10 984 340 39 295 274
1950 475 401 275 899 537 552 1 026 567 3 581 498 5 440 269 16 080 474 53 892 890
1951 509 529 283 090 588 681 1 145 122 4 117 001 6 307 871 18 582 518 65 013 181
1952 474 302 285 768 1 000 906 1 933 057 6 239 586 9 918 343 25 225 173 86 786 173
1953 511 429 259 223 994 793 1 941 950 6 233 265 10 688 402 24 989 834 89 940 961
1954 474 808 285 932 1 239 585 2 439 988 8 466 758 12 522 875 34 095 967 115 750 586
1955 484 434 288 960 1 188 799 2 366 872 8 502 922 12 614 294 37 042 427 114 184 623
1956 506 542 294 735 1 202 096 2 417 529 8 929 759 14 015 059 38 259 852 124 384 982
1957 493 842 298 727 1 531 425 2 522 398 9 716 978 15 867 887 42 574 356 137 420 753
1958 465 633 314 038 1 880 708 3 754 505 11 422 388 18 666 242 51 054 961 154 354 734
1959 474 860 318 560 2 007 960 4 080 349 12 644 908 20 667 418 54 854 365 207 957 115
1960 489 739 289 654 20 872 43 207 131 505 211 426 575 261 1 851 646
1962 510 260 304 652 23 799 51 689 179 993 271 988 716 387 2 693 640
1964 490 275 323 915 42 774 81 049 250 697 418 866 1 043 780 3 493 166
1984 529 454 297 399 503 393 726 116 1 923 359 2 692 150 5 818 956 17 817 570
1994 511 467 326 213 860 155 1 258 239 3 770 233 5 343 627 12 257 300 33 410 881
tabulations were originally published) and the 1984-1994 national samples of individual estate tax returns released by
the French Finance Ministry (DMTG sample; see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J)). 
Table A5: Top Estates Fractiles at Death in France, 1902-1994 (thresholds in current French francs) 
Source: Authors' computations using national tabulations of estate tax returns  by estate brackets  published by the French
Finance Ministry (see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J) for the exact references of the official publications where the rawP0-100 P90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99,5-100 P99,9-100 P99,99-100
1902 8 525 71 556 128 675 440 221 710 626 1 970 616 6 635 051
1903 8 859 76 301 138 694 482 268 784 665 2 161 834 7 336 771
1904 9 412 82 391 151 580 547 082 911 773 2 804 285 13 167 404
1905 9 901 87 214 160 456 591 528 997 333 3 133 434 15 572 542
1907 8 920 76 941 139 928 485 682 788 450 2 134 386 7 147 037
1909 9 661 83 966 153 110 549 159 905 858 2 664 926 10 681 757
1910 9 682 83 343 150 918 526 659 851 179 2 318 107 8 454 133
1911 9 880 86 593 158 353 569 996 946 916 2 810 246 12 386 548
1912 10 200 88 787 161 503 582 218 970 697 2 947 949 13 315 922
1913 10 037 86 594 156 983 551 092 901 135 2 612 763 10 351 818
1925 16 745 134 539 231 693 746 866 1 204 405 3 224 711 11 321 151
1926 18 961 151 695 261 866 855 506 1 400 380 4 018 664 14 554 187
1927 21 574 174 812 303 774 1 026 747 1 685 926 4 928 363 19 426 353
1929 25 758 211 231 370 556 1 294 142 2 147 872 6 369 604 27 275 957
1930 29 249 238 655 418 894 1 471 355 2 446 116 7 276 434 29 621 534
1931 27 515 220 092 381 139 1 278 721 2 099 886 5 931 064 21 873 572
1932 26 831 212 115 365 265 1 200 993 1 952 732 5 445 306 22 149 860
1933 25 344 201 513 347 124 1 138 611 1 848 783 5 116 916 17 152 570
1935 25 690 203 738 352 864 1 184 149 1 946 298 5 794 463 28 586 824
1936 26 104 205 786 355 945 1 194 850 1 982 056 6 014 764 31 470 055
1937 26 728 207 066 354 633 1 139 279 1 838 269 5 041 541 21 057 030
1938 29 937 232 379 390 731 1 257 821 2 040 936 5 969 784 28 702 172
1939 30 109 238 203 399 981 1 291 481 2 091 194 6 135 868 29 941 171
1940 20 342 166 260 263 082 786 302 1 175 832 3 109 278 12 165 886
1941 34 886 262 536 432 810 1 216 876 1 854 827 4 631 172 14 416 347
1942 48 553 368 756 610 409 1 789 059 2 723 332 6 841 357 21 934 432
1943 66 474 508 774 841 023 2 448 598 3 743 288 8 962 841 25 822 502
1944 64 963 515 633 841 898 2 487 037 3 854 609 9 800 408 31 824 124
1945 83 343 632 160 1 034 953 2 938 926 4 481 968 11 183 677 37 671 964
1946 110 853 786 457 1 251 007 3 399 431 5 056 196 12 128 853 34 965 411
1947 153 793 1 074 401 1 703 206 4 602 018 7 024 177 16 892 200 50 325 550
1948 182 529 1 298 212 2 075 464 5 544 903 8 286 405 20 098 556 61 261 960
1949 214 674 1 581 323 2 550 457 7 300 127 10 422 404 27 217 838 73 356 889
1950 268 522 1 996 144 3 226 125 9 024 015 13 707 411 34 211 290 110 977 063
1951 324 131 2 345 782 3 806 841 10 709 068 16 407 918 39 876 272 130 447 133
1952 478 345 3 549 350 5 714 181 15 460 083 22 789 509 54 752 917 151 314 909
1953 467 032 3 542 180 5 687 982 15 205 615 22 630 817 52 911 590 172 830 990
1954 637 193 4 650 830 7 405 531 19 449 695 28 767 340 69 960 377 216 651 262
1955 626 738 4 585 416 7 380 566 19 729 674 29 269 455 69 184 754 199 944 195
1956 693 706 4 816 758 7 805 313 21 072 257 31 425 065 76 235 341 227 396 983
1957 781 078 5 467 843 9 006 043 25 206 827 37 957 630 91 883 836 305 542 552
1958 977 300 6 659 792 10 726 764 29 384 823 43 486 553 99 662 225 285 067 468
1959 1 081 906 7 602 114 12 289 180 34 494 604 51 565 950 130 844 895 452 611 880
1960 11 502 77 751 124 505 338 860 500 329 1 178 968 3 293 893
1962 14 673 100 569 162 115 445 091 672 579 1 711 966 5 709 878
1964 20 129 144 150 232 649 630 799 929 535 2 195 630 7 348 007
1984 173 041 1 121 057 1 617 061 3 735 628 5 228 807 11 410 998 35 881 862
1994 343 938 2 096 720 3 067 094 7 319 247 10 258 099 21 713 287 59 185 958
tabulations were originally published) and the 1984-1994 national samples of individual estate tax returns released by
the French Finance Ministry (DMTG sample; see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J)). 
Table A6: Top Estates Fractiles at Death in France, 1902-1994 (average levels in current French francs) 
Source: Authors' computations using national tabulations of estate tax returns  by estate brackets  published by the 
Finance Ministry (see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J) for the exact references of the official publications where the rawP90-100 P95-100 P99-100 P99,5-100 P99,9-100 P99,99-100
1902 83,94 75,47 51,64 41,68 23,12 7,78
1903 86,13 78,28 54,44 44,29 24,40 8,28
1904 87,54 80,52 58,12 48,44 29,79 13,99
1905 88,09 81,03 59,75 50,37 31,65 15,73
1907 86,26 78,43 54,45 44,19 23,93 8,01
1909 86,91 79,24 56,84 46,88 27,58 11,06
1910 86,08 77,94 54,39 43,96 23,94 8,73
1911 87,64 80,14 57,69 47,92 28,44 12,54
1912 87,05 79,17 57,08 47,58 28,90 13,05
1913 86,27 78,20 54,91 44,89 26,03 10,31
1925 80,35 69,18 44,60 35,96 19,26 6,76
1926 80,01 69,06 45,12 36,93 21,19 7,68
1927 81,03 70,40 47,59 39,07 22,84 9,00
1929 82,01 71,93 50,24 41,69 24,73 10,59
1930 81,59 71,61 50,30 41,81 24,88 10,13
1931 79,99 69,26 46,47 38,16 21,56 7,95
1932 79,06 68,07 44,76 36,39 20,30 8,26
1933 79,51 68,48 44,93 36,47 20,19 6,77
1935 79,31 68,68 46,09 37,88 22,56 11,13
1936 78,83 68,18 45,77 37,97 23,04 12,06
1937 77,47 66,34 42,63 34,39 18,86 7,88
1938 77,62 65,26 42,02 34,09 19,94 9,59
1939 79,11 66,42 42,89 34,73 20,38 9,94
1940 81,73 64,66 38,65 28,90 15,29 5,98
1941 75,26 62,03 34,88 26,58 13,28 4,13
1942 75,95 62,86 36,85 28,04 14,09 4,52
1943 76,54 63,26 36,84 28,16 13,48 3,88
1944 79,37 64,80 38,28 29,67 15,09 4,90
1945 75,85 62,09 35,26 26,89 13,42 4,52
1946 70,95 56,43 30,67 22,81 10,94 3,15
1947 69,86 55,37 29,92 22,84 10,98 3,27
1948 71,12 56,85 30,38 22,70 11,01 3,36
1949 73,66 59,40 34,01 24,28 12,68 3,42
1950 74,34 60,07 33,61 25,52 12,74 4,13
1951 72,37 58,72 33,04 25,31 12,30 4,02
1952 74,20 59,73 32,32 23,82 11,45 3,16
1953 75,84 60,90 32,56 24,23 11,33 3,70
1954 72,99 58,11 30,52 22,57 10,98 3,40
1955 73,16 58,88 31,48 23,35 11,04 3,19
1956 69,44 56,26 30,38 22,65 10,99 3,28
1957 70,00 57,65 32,27 24,30 11,76 3,91
1958 68,14 54,88 30,07 22,25 10,20 2,92
1959 70,27 56,79 31,88 23,83 12,09 4,18
1960 67,60 54,12 29,46 21,75 10,25 2,86
1962 68,54 55,24 30,33 22,92 11,67 3,89
1964 71,61 57,79 31,34 23,09 10,91 3,65
1984 64,79 46,72 21,59 15,11 6,59 2,07
1994 60,96 44,59 21,28 14,91 6,31 1,72
tabulations were originally published) and the 1984-1994 national samples of individual estate tax returns released by
the French Finance Ministry (DMTG sample; see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J)). 
Table A7: Top Estates Fractiles at Death in France, 1902-1994 (shares of top fractiles in total estate (%)) 
Source: Authors' computations using national tabulations of estate tax returns  by estate brackets  published by the 
Finance Ministry (see Piketty (2001a, Appendix J) for the exact references of the official publications where the raw